Party federations: the impacts on popular representation, on parliamentary and party autonomy and on governance

Abstract

This article deals with party federations and reflects on aspects of the Brazilian political constitutional system, especially with the aim of measuring the impact on popular representation, party and parliamentary autonomy and governability. It begins with a conceptual approach to the institute and goes through the reflections proposed regarding the effects of its inclusion in the legal system, using the most current literature on the subject as support. Initially, when reflecting on popular representation, it is possible to understand that the institute does not represent a significant suppression of social representation, as it aims to make it more effective. Next, when dealing with parliamentary and party autonomy, it is verified that both suffer partial
mitigation, since parties and parliamentarians must share a decision-making space previously occupied by a smaller number of individuals. Finally, when discussing governance, it becomes clear that the institute has the ability to facilitate negotiation by the Executive Branch, as there is joint action by several “negotiators” in just one group. In short, it concludes, therefore, that party federations cause significant impacts on the Brazilian political system, with theoretically beneficial intentions that depend on practice for improvement.